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INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, intellectual property law has witnessed
significant changes as both producers and consumers adjust to the
rapid pace of development in the "Information Age." Though many
in the general public are aware of the debates swirling around copy-
right and patent law today,' trademark law faces enormous challenges
as well. The most difficult of these has emerged as companies and
individuals, especially in the digital arena, test the limits of trademark
"fair use" doctrine.
While Coca-Cola and Pepsi continue the "Cola Wars," technology
companies such as Apple, Microsoft, Google, and Samsung have en-
gaged in similar advertising battles for market share. These cam-
paigns pit some of the strongest and most recognizable brands and
trademarks in the world against each other in manners often less
than cordial. The "Get a Mac" campaign, which involved a drab,
middle-aged man (Microsoft/PC) trading barbs with actor Justin
Long (Apple), perfectly captures the general nature of these cam-
paigns.2 These campaigns, usually considered "comparative advertis-
ing," are specifically protected in some respects by provisions in the
2006 Trademark Dilution Revision Act ("TDRA"). But what are the
limitations of these companies' statutory protections under the
TDRA, and more generally under the Lanham Act? And are these
statutory protections enough to protect the rights of individuals and
corporations as the United States Patent and Trademark Office con-
tinues to grant ever more general trademarks? And if not, what
J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2013, University of
Notre Dame. I owe a great deal of thanks to Prof. Gideon Parchomovksy for his feedback
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1 See, e.g., Laura Baverman, Patent Law Changes Alter Entrepreneurs' Planning, USA TODAY
(Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/columnist/2013/09/15/
baverman-entrepreneurs-and-startups/2795063/ (examining the effects new patent laws
are having on start-ups).
2 EveryAppleAd, Apple COMPLETE "Get a Mac" ad campaign compilation (with Bonus ads),
YouTuBE (Dec. 30, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DZSBWbnmGrE.
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changes should be made to ensure a robust, and powerful limitation
to the scope of trademark law's protections?
In answering those questions, this Comment will examine the lim-
itations of today's statutory and common law fair use protections.
The natural limitations of trademark law stem from its underlying
history and the theory that forms its foundation. These narratives
suggest the most effective way to limit trademark law may lie in rec-
ognizing the inherent First Amendment limits of trademark law. Alt-
hough the current statutory and common law scheme uses a patch-
work of doctrines, which often fail to provide coherent and consistent
results, a First Amendment-based fair use doctrine could incorporate
all the underlying concerns into one, unambiguous, and most im-
portantly, predictable doctrine. Additionally, given the First
Amendment has been held to apply to corporations and individuals
alike,3 this doctrine could protect both commercial and private
speech.
This Comment will explore the possibility of a new pleading
standard to augment or possibly replace the current patchwork of fair
use doctrines. Part II will discuss the historical development of
Trademark law and its effect on the development of the fair use doc-
trines. In particular, Parts II.B and II.C will explain how the broad
expansion of trademark rights necessitated the development of
trademark fair use doctrines and continues to put pressure on the
courts to find limits to trademark rights. Part III will then examine
the courts' First Amendment doctrine as it relates to commercial
speech, and the possible implications it has for trademark law. Part
IV will then examine each of the current fair use doctrines in turn
and explain their limitations and the lessons to be gained from their
failures. Finally, Parts V and VI will explain the current First
Amendment limits inherent in trademark law and explain a possible
solution to the problems facing trademark law: a heightened plead-
ing standard.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADEMARK LAW AND FAIR USE DEFENSES
It is important to note, here at the outset, the fundamental differ-
ence between trademark law and the two other forms of federally
protected intellectual property, copyright and patent. Though copy-
right and patent law incentivize ingenuity by requiring some type of
3 See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964).
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creativity to acquire protection, trademark holders acquire protec-
tion simply by appropriating a word, phrase, etc., to represent their
products or services.5 Consequently, one must understand the history
and theoretical underpinnings of trademark law to understand why
Congress granted trademark protection in the first place, the scope
of its protections, and the importance of the limitations to trademark
law that fair use doctrines provide.
Part I.A discusses the early development of trademark law, and
how its limits precluded the need for fair use defenses. Part I.B ex-
amines the changes wrought by the Trademark Act of 1909 and the
Lanham Act of 1946 and how these changes necessitated the devel-
opment of fair use defenses as the scope of trademark grew to its cur-
rent extent. Finally, Part I.C offers a brief analysis of the conse-
quences of trademark law's growth.
A. The "Passing Off' Requirement: The Natural Limits of Trademark
Protection
Trademark law developed relatively recently when compared to
many other branches of law. The first case in the United States to
grant relief for a violation of "trademark rights" was not decided until
1844 in Taylor v. Carpenter.' But it was not until 1879, thirty years lat-
er, that the Supreme Court finally recognized that it was a settled
manner, under state law, that individuals had the right to "adopt and
use a symbol or a device to distinguish the goods or property made or
sold by the person whose mark it is, to the exclusion of use by all oth-
er persons."7 Yet, the Court resisted Congress's attempts to federalize
those protections under the Copyright and Patent Clause of the Con-
stitution, noting that trademarks did not involve any new inventions
or expressive writings.' Arguing that some form of inventiveness or
"genius" was required before the Congress could grant an exclusive
right to the trademark's owner, the Court struck down the first
Trademark Act." Congress finally granted federal trademark protec-
4 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879).
5 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
6 23 F. Cas. 742 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844) (Story, J.) (cited in Hannibal Travis, The Battle for
Mindshare: The Emerging Consensus that the First Amendment Protects Corporate Criticism and
Parody on the Internet, 10 VA.J.L. & TCH 1, 6 n.21 (2005)).
7 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879).
8 Id. at 92-94.
9 Id. at 94-99.
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tion successfully in 1905, by acting under the Commerce Clause to
ban trademark infringement in interstate or foreign commerce.
Although today trademark law protects against non-competitors
and competitors alike, in its original form, it simply prevented com-
peting merchants from appropriating one another's marks. In Canal
Co. v. Clark," the Supreme Court described trademark infringement
in these terms:
[I]n all cases where rights to the exclusive use of a trade-mark are invad-
ed, it is invariably held that the essence of the wrong consists in the sale
of the goods of one manufacturer or vender as those of another; and that
it is only when this false representation is directly or indirectly made that
12the party who appeals to a court of equity can have relief.
Courts crafted nineteenth century trademark law to protect pro-
ducers from illegitimate trade diversion, making it a species of the
"broader law of unfair competition."3
The primary difference between trademark infringement and un-
fair competition hinged upon the different burdens of showing in-
tent. Because the use of another's trademark was unlikely to have a
legitimate explanation, trademark infringement cases used an almost
strict liability standard, while unfair competition claimants had to
prove the defendant's intent to pass off its products as its own.' The
Supreme Court itself noted in 1916 that the "essential element is the
same in trade-mark cases as in cases of unfair competition unaccom-
panied with trade-mark infringement."6 Consequently, trademark
law was limited to cases of deceptiveness, particularly those in which a
competitor attempted to pass its goods as those of another.
As scholars Mark McKenna and William McGeveran recently ar-
ticulated, these natural limits ensured that early trademark law only
reached a "limited range of particularly egregious conduct."7 These
limitations also prevented conflict between trademark rights and
broader competition or speech values.' Therefore, courts had no
10 Pub. L. No. 58-84, 33 Stat. 724 (1905).
11 80 U.S. 311 (1871).
12 Id. at 322.
13 Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1839, 1860 (2007).
14 Id. at 1862.
15 Id.
16 Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916).
17 William McGeveran & Mark P. McKenna, Confusion Isn't Everything, 89 NOTRE DAME. L.
REv. 253, 261 (2013).
18 Id. at 261.
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need for explicit fair use doctrines, as the inherent limits of trade-
mark law protected defendants.
For example, in Prestonettes, the Supreme Court had to decide
whether the repackaging of another's product, and subsequent use of
the original trademark to advertise the repackaged goods, violated
the rights of the trademark holder.20 In finding that such a use was
allowed, the Supreme Court pointed out:
If the name of Coty were allowed to be printed in different letters from
the rest of the inscription dictated by the District Court a casual purchas-
er might look no further and might be deceived. But when it in no way
stands out from the statement of facts that unquestionably the defendant
has a right to communicate in some form, we see no reason why it should
not be used collaterally, not to indicate the goods, but to say that the
trade-marked product is a constituent in the article now offered as new
and changed. As a general proposition there can be no doubt that the
21
word might be so used.
The Court's holding in Prestonettes illustrated "that trademark was
not concerned with any use of a mark unless it deceived consumers
into purchasing the defendant's product instead of the plaintiffs."22
Consequently, defendants had no need for fair use defenses that cat-
egorically protected speech; trademark law contained itself.
B. The Shift to Confusion: An Increasing Need for Fair Use
Yet, what began as a species of unfair competition intended to
protect consumers from misleading goods and producers from char-
latans trading on their marks' goodwill, quickly evolved into some-
thing more. While the 1909 Trademark Act wrought some changes,
the major shift occurred with the Lanham Act2 4 in 1946. Courts in-
terpreted the Lanham Act to prohibit, as infringement, any use of a
mark that was likely to cause confusion as to a potential connection
between the junior user and the mark owner in the consumer's mind,
regardless of whether or not competition was present.25 The Act also
19 Id.
20 Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 366-67 (1924).
21 Id. at 368-69.
22 McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 17, at 262.
23 The Act defined trademark infringement as using the same mark as the plaintiff on goods
"of 'substantially the same descriptive proprieties,'" broadening the scope of what was
considered a competing product. McKenna, supra note 13, at 1900 n.259 (citing Pub. L.
No. 58-84, 33 Stat. 727 (1905), repealed by Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-459, § 46(a), 60
Stat. 427, 444 (1946) (codified as amended in various sections of 15 U.S.C.)).
24 Pub. L. No. 79-459 (1946) (codified in various sections of 15 U.S.C.).
25 See e.g., Stork Rest, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 363-64 (9th Cir. 1948) (granting a New
York nightclub relief against a San Francisco bar for the use of "Stork Club" name).
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allowed plaintiffs to sue for confusion surrounding the mark owner's
sponsorship of, or affiliation with, ajunior user for the first time.
Nearly fifty years later, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
("FTDA") , and its revision under the Trademark Dilution Revision
Act ("TDRA"),28 further expanded trademark law's reach by allowing
mark owners to sue without any kind of competition between two
marks. These new laws attached liability if a defendant's use could:
(1) "dilute" or weaken the public's connection between the famous
mark and its owner; or (2) reduce a famous mark's goodwill by tar-
29nishing it in some way. Consequently, the primary purpose of
trademark law shifted from preventing merchants from "passing off'
their goods under another, superior trademark," to more broadly
protecting a trademark owner's hypothetical future business in its
market and other potential marks.3 '
As the scope of trademark law's protections shifted, what courts
found constituted infringement shifted accordingly. In the late nine-
teenth century, Justice Story argued that British precedent supported
finding trademark infringement where any "colorable imitation" of
the "words, names, and devices" used by a plaintiff occurred. By the
early twentieth century, courts generally agreed that as long as a care-
less customer could be occasionally misled, relief should be granted
33in trademark cases.
The pattern of increasingly broad trademark rights continued
such that, by 1942, if a defendant so much as "poache[d] upon the
commercial magnetism of the [plaintiffs] symbol," the Supreme
Court found that the owner could get relief." By the late 1990s,
courts had expanded their test for trademark infringement to the
point that even the likelihood of consumer confusion countenanced
finding liability, even in the case of parodies.35 The FTDA and TDRA
further extended the likelihood of confusion test to dilution, allow-
ing courts to find liability upon the showing of even a likelihood of
26 McKenna, supra note 13, at 1902.
27 Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)).
28 Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)).
29 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1).
30 See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. New Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1992).
31 Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1839, 1903-04 (2007).
32 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQuITYJURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND
AND AMERICA at 254 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Little, Brown and Co. 1988) (13th ed.
1886).
33 See, e.g., Florence Mfg. Co. v.J.C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910).
34 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942).
35 Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1404-06 (9th Cir. 1997).
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dilution or tarnishment.3 Thus, in little more than a century, courts
shifted from finding liability where a defendant had imitated a com-
petitor's mark to sell his own goods, to finding liability where a de-
fendant's use of a mark could merely diminish the usefulness of that
mark to its owner.
During this historic expansion of trademark owners' rights, fair
use doctrines began performing a critical role in trademark law by
preventing it from inhibiting First Amendment protected speech by
individuals. This inhibition most often occurred when owners "pre-
vent[ed] uses of their marks as obvious parodies or for entirely non-
commercial purposes."3 7 Though many in the legal community have
focused on the threat trademark overexpansion poses to expressive
speech,8 such overexpansion has also had a chilling effect on com-
merce and industry. As William McGeveran notes:
An artist or a small business has little capacity to resist when facing possi-
ble suit from a litigious trademark holder, unpredictable law, and big le-
gal bills for a long fight. But, large entities--even entire industries-also
respond to these risks conservatively. They adopt trademark rights clear-
ance practices that avoid all danger of liability, institutionalizing an in-
centive structure contrary to free speech values. For example, insurers
often demand rights clearance for every single expressive use of a trade-
mark in documentaries; reality television producers obscure unlicensed
trademark logos captured incidentally in the footage they air; Google al-
lows markholders to ban the use of their trademarks in others' adver-
tisements; and the virtual world Second Life generally forbids graphical
items created by individuals if they incorporate trademarks.3 9
To protect expressive uses of trademark and mitigate the severest of
the anti-competitive effects of trademark law, Congress and the judi-
ciary itself developed a wide range of doctrines,o which protect cer-
tain uses considered outside the scope of trademark law.
Outside the expressive sphere, these "fair use" doctrines were
generally instituted to avoid trademark law's anti-competitive effects.4 2
For example, descriptive fair use prevents companies who use a ge-
36 15 U.S.C. 1125(c) (1).
37 Mark Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TExAs L. REv. 873, 900
(1997).
38 See, e.g., Connie Davis Nichols & Charley Carroll, Trouble in Trademark Law: How Applying
Different Theories Leaves Door Open for Abuse, 17 SMU SC. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2014).
39 William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REv. 49, 62-63 (2008) (cita-
tions omitted).
40 See infra Part VI (examining several different iterations of fair use, such as descriptive
"traditional" fair use, trademark "use requirement," nominative fair use, etc.).
41 See McGeveran, supra note 39, at 56-59.
42 Graeme W. Austin, Tolerating Confusion About Confusion: Trademark Policies and Fair Use, 50
AIjz. L. REv. 157, 177 (2008).
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neric term from gaining proprietary rights in words that name the
relevant goods or services.4 As Graeme Austin pointed out:
Curtailing the trademark monopoly on descriptive words facilitates com-
petition; it may also protect after-markets for such things as secondhand
goods, sundries, and repairs services. Nominative fair use, a doctrine first
described as such by the Ninth Circuit, [also] serve [s] to protect First
Amendment values by enabling firms to use others' trademarks in certain
44expressive contexts.
Justice Brennan further noted the importance of the fair use defense
and expressive freedoms: "The fair-use defense . . . prevents the
award of a trademark from regulating a substantial amount of non-
commercial speech."45 Thus, as trademark law has grown, courts and
Congress attempted to counteract the pernicious anti-competitive ef-
fects of expansive trademark protection with various "fair use" doc-
trines.
C. Consequences
As illustrated above, trademark overexpansion limits the ability of
companies, large and small, to advertise, and even compare, their
products with those of others.4 6  Especially with the expansion of
trademark protettion under the TDRA, corporations must ensure
they fit within specific dilution fair use defenses, or risk facing mas-
sive liability for their actions.47 Though Congress and the courts have
acknowledged these problems by placing specific statutory defenses
in the FTDA/TDRA-in addition to the existing fair use defenses-
each of these doctrines suffer from weaknesses that limit their effec-
tiveness and utility to individuals and corporations alike. In particu-
lar, they lead to a great deal of uncertainty for both mark owner and
user alike.4 ' This uncertainty is particularly pernicious because it
forces extreme caution on the part of even large businesses to avoid
the possibility of massive trademark liability, thus chilling both com-
43 Id. at 176-77.
44 Id. at 177 (citation omitted).
45 S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 565 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
46 See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10-Civ-1611, 2012 WL
1481510 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2012) (holding that a three second clip of a commercial show-
ing the 'LV' mark on a basketball was not fair use and infringed Louis Vuitton's trade-
mark).
47 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (allowing for double or even treble damages for the intentional violation
of a trademark, even if done with the belief that the use was legal).
48 See infra Part IV.
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mercial and expressive uses of trademark.4" As William McGeveran
pointed out:
[I]nsurers often demand rights clearance for every single expressive use
of a trademark in documentaries; reality television producers obscure un-
licensed trademark logos capture incidentally in the footage they
air ... and the virtual world Second Life generally forbids graphical
items created by individuals if they incorporate trademarks.5o
To specifically illustrate the problem, though Google formally al-
lowed mark holders to ban the use of their trademarks in other's ad-
vertisements,5 since reversing this policy it has been the subject of
several lawsuits as mark holders assert "keying" advertisements on
search engines to searches of specific trademarks constitutes trade-
mark infringement.' Thus, even major corporations have felt pres-
sured to significantly limit their use of others' trademarks, even if the
use is relatively innocuous or, as in cases involving reality television,
accidental.
Additionally, the uncertainty appears to increase the aggressive-
ness of mark holders looking for quick, favorable settlements.3
Though now several years old, Kenneth Port's survey of trademark
cases has shown that while the number of trademark cases filed con-
tinues to rise, the percentage of cases that reach a trial on the merits,
the total number of cases reported, the total amount of damages, and
the total number of cases where an injunction is demanded are all
decreasing.4 This development poses a serious threat to both indi-
viduals and corporations as some companies and individuals turn to
trademark for an independent revenue stream.
Yet the weaknesses of current fair use doctrines suggest how to
structure a new fair use doctrine and to ensure that the future solu-
49 McGeveran, supra note 39, at 63.
50 Id. (citations omitted).
51 Id.
52 See, e.g., Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 149 (4th Cir. 2012) (asserting
direct infringement claims against Google for trademark "keyed" advertisements); Res-
cuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 124 (2d Cir. 2009) (same).
53 Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
585, 589, 633 (2008).
54 Id.
55 See, e.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co, 799 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1986)
(suing a competitor for trademark infringement); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc.,
778 F.2d 1352 (9th Cit. 1985) (en banc) (same);Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Levi Strauss
& Co., 841 F. Supp 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (same); Michael Barbaro & Julie Creswell, With a
Trademark in Its Pocket, Levi's Turns to Suing Its RivaLs, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 29, 2007, at Al, A16
("[C]ompetitors say the [trademark infringement] lawsuits are the last resort of a poor
loser, a company that has lost billions in sales, laid off thousands of workers and flirted
with bankruptcy as the denim industry exploded.").
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tion successfully navigates the balance between ensuring the trade-
mark owners' rights are respected and minimizing the uncertainty
surrounding trademark that leads to the anti-competitive and speech-
limiting effects that broad trademark protections have on the market.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT: COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADEMARK LAW
Given that significant trademark litigation takes place in the
commercial arena, any discussion of a First Amendment limitation of
trademark law requires an examination of the Supreme Court's
commercial speech doctrine. Although historically the doctrine has
been extremely limited-allowing the government to prohibit signifi-
cant amounts of speech to protect trademark rights-recent moves in
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence suggest that these protections are
weakening. These developments undergird the proposition that a
First Amendment limitation to trademark doctrine is even possible.
In fact, now, more than ever, the Supreme Court appears to have
opened the door for real development in the trademark arena.
As Lisa Ramsey has noted, from 1942 to 1980 the Supreme Court
dramatically expanded the degree of protection commercial speech
enjoys." After holding in 1946 that "the Constitution imposes
no ... restraint on government as respects purely commercial adver-
tising,"5 the Supreme Court reversed course in 1976 when it explicit-
ly held that the First Amendment protects commercial speech." In
doing so, the Court emphasized the important informational value
provided by commercial speech to its audience.5
For example, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., the Supreme Court struck down a Virginia
regulation that prohibited licensed pharmacists from advertising the
cost of prescription drugs.60 In striking down the regulation on First
Amendment grounds the Court pointed out, a "particular consum-
er's interest in the free flow of commercial information ... may be as
keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent
political debate."6 Additionally, the Court specifically noted that the
56 Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 S.M.U. L. REV. 381,
390-95 (2008).
57 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
58 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762-65,
770 (1976).
59 C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L.J. 981, 982 (2009).
60 Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 749-50, 773.
61 Id. at 763.
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transactions posed by the advertisements were completely legal, thus
the state's interest in preventing these ads was extremely limited.
Justice Blackmun also expressed deep concern about government pa-
ternalism as a result of its limitations upon certain advertising." As
the Court said about Virginia's regulation of advertising,
There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach.
That alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself harmful,
that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well
enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the
channels of communication rather than to close them ... the choice
among these alternative approaches is not ours to make or the Virginia
General Assembly's. It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dan-
gers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is
freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us.
Nevertheless, though the Court in Virginia Pharmacy did lay commer-
cial speech firmly within the protections of the First Amendment, it
did not completely dissolve regulation of commercial speech.
Since Virginia Pharmacy, the Supreme Court has upheld a variety
of commercial speech regulations. Virginia Pharmacy itself stated
some bans-such as those on false or misleading speech, restrictions
on advertising for illegal products, and regulations related to the
time, place, or manner of commercial speech-were acceptable limi-
tations of speech." To evaluate challenges to limits on commercial
speech the court has applied the test laid out in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York.6
Though significantly more lenient than the strict scrutiny applied
67
in political speech questions, since approximately 1990 the Court
has used Central Hudson to strike down commercial speech regula-
tions." Central Hudson turned on the question of whether New York's
complete prohibition of promotional advertising by utilities violated
the First Amendment by preventing truthful informative speech.9 To
answer that question, the Central Hudson court developed a four part
test:
62 Id. at 772.
63 Id. at 769-70.
64 Id. at 770.
65 Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72
66 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
67 See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Federal Election Com'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441, 1444 (2014) (ap-
plying strict scrutiny under the First Amendment to limits on campaign donations by
corporations).
68 Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 783, 795 (2007).
69 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 558-61.
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At the outset, [the court] must determine whether the expression is pro-
tected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within
that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be mislead-
ing. Next, [the court] ask[s] whether the asserted governmental interest
is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, [the court] must
determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental in-
terest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.70
After examining each of these prongs, Justice Powell concluded that
the record before the court showed the total ban on promotional ad-
vertising was more extensive than necessary to serve the state interest
of conversation." Though the Court appeared to later weaken the
standard by only requiring a "reasonable" fit rather than the "least re-
strictive means," the Court has continued to exhibit "a strong anti-
paternalism principle, which flatly forbids suppressing commercial
speech 'in order to prevent members of the public from making bad
decisions with the information.'"
For example, in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, the Court faced
a regulation similar to that in Virginia Pharmacy, a complete ban on
the advertisement of liquor prices. The Court reinforced its posi-
tion that blanket limitations on speech do not protect consumers
from commercial harms.75  Reinforcing the point, Justice Stevens
wrote, "when a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful,
nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the
preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to
depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally
demands." Though Justice Scalia expressed some reservation about
the legitimacy of Central Hudson's protection of truthful and non-
misleading commercial speech in his 44 Liquormart concurrence, he
maintained that the Court should protect commercial speech.
Many of the current justices on the Supreme Court have thus
demonstrated an interest in increasing the level of scrutiny applied to
commercial speech restrictions. Yet, the continuing categorical ex-
70 Id. at 566.
71 Id. at 571-72.
72 See Bd. Of Trs., State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1989) (requiring a nar-
rowly tailored means that fits the objective).
73 Bhagwat, supra note 68, at 795 (quoting Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535
U.S. 357, 374 (2002)).
74 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996) (joint opinion of Stevens,
Kennedy, and Ginsburg,]J.).
75 Id. at 499.
76 Id. at 501.
77 Id. at 517 (ScaliaJ., concurring).
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clusion of misleading or false commercial speech from First Amend-
ment protection leaves trademark law firmly within constitutional
bounds." Nevertheless, because trademark law also applies to non-
misleading commercial speech and noncommercial speech, the
Court's ongoing exclusion does not end every conflict between
trademark and free speech rights." While the Court's most recent
discussion of Central Hudson did not display significant interest in re-
vising the standard of review for limitations upon commercial
speech,0 many of the justices who supported such an expansion re-
main on the bench. Moreover, in a series of recent cases the Court
has indicated a willingness to raise the burden on a lawsuit's initiation
and to stand up for corporate rights,81 suggesting that the current
Court may support a higher pleading standard in situations where
both corporations' and individuals' speech is limited.
III. MODERN TRADEMARK FAIR USE DOCTRINES & THEIR WEAKNESSES
Over the course of the last century and a half, a number of limita-
tions have ensured that trademark owners do not abuse the exclusive,
non-termed rights they enjoy. Some fair use doctrines grew out of
the common law and reflect the natural limits of trademark protec-
tions at the time. As Congress expanded those rights, it also includ-
ed several statutory exemptions to protect certain uses from prosecu-
tion. Consequently, today four major fair use doctrines-Trademark
Use, Descriptive "Classical" Fair Use, Nominative Fair Use, and the
categorical statutory exemptions included in the TDRA-protect cer-
tain uses of trademarks." Each doctrine has its own unique ad-
vantages and disadvantages. The limited First Amendment balancing
test currently used by some courts will be discussed infra in Part V.
78 Ramsey, supra note 56, at 395.
79 Id.
80 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2552 (2012) (citing Central Hudson as an ex-
ample of what situations qualify for intermediate scrutiny).
81 See Citizens United v. Federal Election Com'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2014) (recognizing corpo-
rations have First Amendment political speech rights); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (recognizing that a closely held corporation's exercise of reli-
gion could be substantially burdened by an HHS contraceptives mandate); Aschroft v. Iq-
bal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (generalizing the pleading standard in Twiombly to all cases); Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (establishing a higher pleading standard
for plaintiffs in a anti-trust law suit).
82 Michael Grynberg, Things are Worse Than We Think: Trademark Defenses in a "Formalist" Age,
24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897, 901-904 (2009) (explaining many common law defenses in
trademark law were eventually codified).
83 See infra Part IV.
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A. Trademark Use
Though not explicitly a fair use doctrine, the "trademark use doc-
trine" lies at the forefront of one of the most rancorous debates con-
cerning trademarks today. The dispute pits search engines and other
advertisers who use trademarks to sell advertisements against the
owners of those marks who believe their actions constitute illegal
trade on their goodwill.84 Because "the trademark use requirement
serves a gatekeeper function, limiting the reach of trademark law
without regard to a factual inquiry into consumer confusion,""' each
side seeks to show the doctrine favors its own. The doctrine's abso-
lute bar to litigation where it attaches also makes it a very appealing
solution for those concerned about the growing scope of trademark
law.
The use doctrine is a natural outgrowth of trademark theory. The
doctrine arises from the foundation of trademark protection, that a
mark must be used to indicate a good or service's origin in order to
816
acquire trademark protection. In essence, the doctrine protects the
user of a mark from liability when the mark is not being used to indi-
cate the source of a good or service. Although a very powerful and
useful bar to halting litigation early, this doctrine's usefulness has
been severely limited.
The problem arises in the amended Lanham Act itself. The Act
states that a trademark is used "as a mark" if consumers believe the
use indicates: "the affiliation, connection, or association of the [the
defendant] with another person, or ... the origin, sponsorship or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by an-
other person."" Yet, to make these determinations usually requires
an investigation of the likelihood of confusion between the marks,
undermining the value that this defense offers in ending a lawsuit in
the early stages of litigation. Even those who support the defense
argue that it really only helps in the "easy cases," while only offering
84 See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 127-29 (2d Cir. 2009) (concern-
ing Google's recommendation of Rescuecom's trademark to businesses buying key-
words).
85 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41
Hous. L. REv. 777, 805 (2004).
86 15 U.S.CA § 1127 ("[T]o identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique
product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the
goods, even if that source is unknown.")
87 McGeveran, supra note 39, at 79 (2008) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000)).
88 See id. at 80 ("Evidentiary issues arising from such an approach probably would destroy
any early 'gatekeeper' character of the doctrine.").
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"limited value in close cases."9 Thus from a practical standpoint,
trademark use doctrine does not offer an effective, efficient way to
limit trademark law, especially in the case of corporations whose uses
often strain the boundaries of what may be considered fair use. Nev-
ertheless, the use doctrine's failure shows that any effective fair use
doctrine cannot depend on a subjective determination of what a con-
sumer may think, but rather on an objective assessment of the use it-
self and what it suggests about the defendant's intent. The use doc-
trine also highlights the importance of making fair use
determinations early on in litigation.
B. Descriptive "Classical" Fair Use
Unlike trademark use, "classical fair use" functions as an affirma-
tive defense against liability for the use of descriptive trademarks.
Though normally unprotectable, descriptive trademarks may be reg-
istered once a word or phrase comes to indicate the source of a par-
ticular item in the minds of the consuming public." Although one
may register such a mark, the Lanham Act' provides an affirmative
defense for uses of trademarked language or imagery to describe the
attributes of a defendant's product.9 2 The complicated language of
the statute's test to determine whether or not a use falls into that safe
haven has been simplified by the Seventh Circuit into a three element
test which requires: (1) non-trademark use; (2) descriptiveness; and
(3) fairness and good faith. The defense works to ensure that
trademark law does not fall afoul of the First Amendment by interfer-
ing with everyday language. The defense also mitigates the otherwise
extremely anti-competitive effects, such as preventing the advertise-
ment of an entire class of goods, which could otherwise result from
granting protection to descriptive trademarks.
Two cases perfectly illustrate how courts have operationalized the
doctrine. In Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Group Smoke Houses, the plaintiff,
89 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark. A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law through Trademark Use, 92
IOWA. L. REv. 1669, 1674 (2007).
90 See, e.g., Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grp. Smoke Houses, 698 F.2d 786, 790, 792 (5th Cir. 1983)
(stating that while descriptive terms are not ordinarily protectable as trademarks, they
may be protected if they acquire a secondary meaning).
91 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (4) (2000).
92 Id.
93 McGeveran, supra note 39, at 83 (citing Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co.,
978 F.2d 947, 951 (7th Cir. 1992)).
94 See McGeveran, supra note 39, at 82 ("Without such limitations, markholders could gain
an unfair advantage by preventing competitors from describing their products adequate-
ly, and the public would lose valuable information that reduces search costs.").
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Zatarains, asserted its exclusive right to the terms "Fish-Fri" and
"Chick-Fri."" Although the court found "Chick-Fri" an invalid trade-
mark-it lacked any secondary meaning-"Fish-Fri" had garnered
enough recognition to be considered a valid trademark.9 Neverthe-
less, the court turned to descriptive fair use before deciding Zata-
rains' claim of infringement. The Fifth Circuit, though it did not lay
out three prongs explicitly, found that the defendants easily met the
qualifications of the defense.7 The court highlighted: (1) that the
defendants' testimony at trial and their failure to attempt to register
the mark indicated the non-trademark use of the mark; (2) they used
the words to describe a type of coating mix they manufactured; and
(3) that they consciously packaged and labeled their products in such
a way to minimize any chance of confusion." Consequently, the
court found that the defendants were entitled to the fair use of "Fish-
Fri" to describe their products.
In another leading case, Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranbermes,
Inc., the manufacturer of the famous "Swee Tarts" candy sued to pre-
vent Ocean Spray from using the term "sweet-tart."" The Seventh
Circuit quickly found that the use of "sweet-tart" was descriptive, and
disagreed with the district court's assertion that "sweet-tart" could be
considered a trademark when used by Ocean Spray.'00 Nevertheless,
the court also found that, given the lack of any evidence of consumer
confusion, the district court had not made any error in making the
factual finding that the term had been used in bad faith."o' Once
again, the court suggested that the analysis was relatively straightfor-
ward, albeit one which required a fair amount of discovery or other
investigation to prove.10
95 Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grp. Smoke Houses, 698 F.2d 786, 788 (5th Cir. 1983).
96 Id. at 796-97.
97 Id. at 796.
98 Id.
99 Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1995).
100 Id. at 1059.
101 Id. at 1060.
102 Although Zatarains and Sunmark both suggested that there could not be more than a re-
mote chance of confusion in order for the fair-use defense to apply, the Supreme Court
clarified that some confusion was perfectly acceptable in KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v.
Lasting Impression 1, Inc. 543 U.S. 111, 124 (2004) (finding that "the defendant has no in-
dependent burden to negate the likelihood of any confusion in raising the affirmative de-
fense that a term is used descriptively, not as mark, fairly, and in good faith").
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Although relatively effective in preventing the broad appropria-
tion of language, 103 three problems work together to vastly limit the
usefulness of this defense as a general limit to trademark law. First,
this defense often requires at least some of the likelihood of confu-
sion analysis to be completed before it may be invoked.0 4 Although
one clearly need not affirmatively disprove any likelihood of confu-
sion to benefit from this defense,' the Supreme Court has not ex-
plained what role likelihood of confusion should play in the analy-
sis.o Consequently, the Ninth Circuit does not examine the defense
until after a long examination of the likelihood of confusion, while
the Second Circuit holds that likelihood of confusion plays no part in
a classical fair use analysis.'7 The inconsistencies surrounding the
test's procedure drastically limit its usefulness as a consistent protec-
tion for defendants and limit on trademark protections. In addition,
at least the Ninth Circuit has made it clear that judges should leave
the question of fair use in most cases to the jury,'08 further reducing
its usefulness.
For example, in Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores Brand
Management,'" the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court's summary
judgment motion that held Victoria's Secret's use of the term "deli-
cious" on a tank top was fair use as a matter of law. After concluding
that the question of whether or not there was consumer confusion
fell too close for the district court to grant summary judgment, the
court went on to state that, though "it [was] possible Victoria's Secret
used the term "Delicious" fairly," the court believed ajury was better
suited to answer the question."' It then launched into a long analysis
of the nine Sleekcraft factors"' before concluding that because the
103 Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 951 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting
that section 33(b) (4) embodies the "principle that no one should be able to appropriate
descriptive language through trademark registration").
104 See McGeveran, supra note 39, 84-85 (noting that although the Supreme Court held that
defendants need not disprove likelihood of confusion to benefit from the defense, it left
it up to lower courts to determine what role likelihood of confusion should play in the
analysis).
105 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 124 (2004).
106 See id. at 123 (stating that some confusion may occur without losing the defense).
107 McGeveran, supra note 39, at 85.
108 Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., 618 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th
Cir. 2010) (citing KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d
596, 609 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that genuine issues of material fact indicate that the fact
finder should determine whether the "defense of fair use has been established")).
109 Fortune Dynamic, Inc., 618 F,3d at 1044.
110 Id. at 1031.
111 See generally, AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979) (utilizing these
nine factors to determine likelihood of confusion: (1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity
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question of likelihood of confusion was a close one, by necessity fair
use was not appropriate at summary judgment.2
Yet this seems quite mistaken, given that the Supreme Court clear-
ly stated in KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc. that
some confusion was perfectly compatible with fair use. In KP Perma-
nent, the Court was faced with the question of whether the mark "Mi-
cro Colors" should be considered a descriptive mark, and whether a
competitor's use of the mark to describe their own line of permanent
cosmetic make-up was fair use.1 3 After finding the mark descriptive,
the Court turned to the question of whether or not confusion pre-
cluded a finding of fair use." Pointing out that the burden to prove
confusion lay on the plaintiff, the Court affirmatively held that some
confusion did not preclude a finding of fair use."
Second, even when courts do separate the analysis under §
1115(b) (4) from the likelihood of confusion analysis, they still often
perform a lengthy, fact-intensive analysis giving rise to the same prob-
lems as found in trademark use. In fact, at least one court has stated
that § 1115(b) (4)'s descriptiveness element is essentially the mirror
image of nontrademark use, making a use descriptive only if is not
source-identifying." The failure to explain what constitutes a
"trademark use" necessitates extensive fact finding, abrogating one of
the primary goals of a fair use defense, an easily discernable bounda-
ry between protected and non-protected uses. The Second Circuit's
discussion above in Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, offers a perfect example of
these kinds of analyses.
In Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, when determining whether or not the
district court had erred in granting summary judgment on the fair
use defense, the court spent a great deal of time examining the three
factors of descriptive fair use before concluding that insufficient evi-
dence on one factor, good faith, precluded summary judgment."7
The court held, that because there was a disagreement on each of the
three issues, it could not grant summary judgment in regards to fair
of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing
channels used; (6) type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the pur-
chaser; (7) defendant's intent in selecting the mark; (8) likelihood of expansion of the
product lines; and (9) other factors that bear on the likelihood of confusion).
112 Fotune Dynamic, 618 F.3d at 1044.
113 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 114 (2004).
114 Id. at 121.
115 Id. at 121-123.
116 Whirlpool Props. v. LG Elecs. U.SA., Inc., No 1:03-cv-414, 2005 WL 3088339, at *20 (W.D.
Mich. Nov. 17, 2005).
117 Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 303, 308-313 (2d Cir. 2013).
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use, despite strong evidence on both sides."8 This case perfectly illus-
trates the difficulty of establishing fair use as an evidentiary matter,
which precludes its invocation at summary judgment or earlier.
Third and finally, the lack of clarity concerning the defense's
scope dramatically limits its usefulness. Some courts spend a great
deal of time determining whether the plaintiff was describing their
own product or that of a competitor, only allowing the defense if the
defendant used the descriptive mark in question exclusively in refer-
ence to his product."9 Other courts use § 1115(b) (4) as a defense for
any descriptive mark's use, regardless of any relationship it bears to
the plaintiffs product.'" This third issue particularly negates this de-
fense's usefulness as it represents the opposite of a clear-cut and
straightforward manner to determine the legality of the use of a given
mark. Instead, companies and individuals are encouraged to forum
shop to find jurisdictions where the use in question is more, in the
case of plaintiffs, or less, in the case of defendants, likely to be found
descriptive. The wide variations on these issues call for intervention
by Congress or the Supreme Court to normalize the law.
C. Nominative Fair Use
Although far from universally accepted, "nominative fair use" has
emerged as a separate defense from classic fair use that also reflects
First Amendment concerns. Judge Alex Kozinski introduced the de-
fense in his opinion from the famous 1992 case, New Kids on the Block
v. News America Publishing, Inc.'2 ' The defense protects those who use
a mark to "refer to a particular product for purposes of comparison,
criticism, point of reference, or such other purpose" when doing so
without the mark is virtually impossible otherwise.
For example, in New Kids, the defendant newspapers ran two dif-
ferent advertisements asking the pressing question, "Which one of
the New Kids is the most popular? USA Today's announcement con-
118 Id. at 313.
119 See, e.g., Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150-52 (9th Cir. 2002) (limiting sec-
tion 33(b) (4) strictly to cases "where a defendant has used the plaintiffs mark only to de-
scribe his own product, and not at all to describe the plaintiffs product.")
120 See,e.g., Cosmetically Sealed Industries, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's USA Co., 125 F. 3d
28, 30 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Though the terms of the Act recognize the fair use defense where
the name or term is used 'to describe the goods,' that phrase has not been narrowly con-
fined to words that describe a characteristic of the goods such as size or quality. Instead
we have recognized that the phrase permits use of words or images that are used in judge
Leval's helpful expression in their 'descriptive sense.'").
121 New Kids on the Block v. News. Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
122 Id. at 306.
May 2016] 1565
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
tained a picture of the New Kids and asked, 'Who's the best on the
block?""2 3 The New Kids asserted that the use of their name in the
poll constituted trademark infringement.2 4  In their defense, the
newspapers claimed that their polls were protected under the First
Amendment as "part and parcel of their 'news-gathering activities.' -12
Consequently, the case pitched the First Amendment squarely against
trademark law.
To resolve the controversy, Judge Kozinksi offered a three-prong
test to determine if the use was fair as a "nominative use":
First, the product or service in question must be one not readily identifi-
able without use of the trademark; second, only so much of the mark or
marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or
service; and third, the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction
with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark
holder.'
Applying the test in New Kids, Judge Kozinksi came to the logical
conclusion that a newspaper's poll of its readers concerning a band
constituted a fair use of the band's trademarked name.'
Although the test concluded logically in New Kids, the test itself
has proven to be less reliable. The first, and worst, problem with the
doctrine results from the collapse of the fair use determinations into
a substitute likelihood of confusion analysis. The court's lack of
guidance in New Kids as to what sorts of actions might create a wrong-
ful suggestion of "sponsorship or endorsement" leads to this result.2 1
Consequently, courts often deny summary judgment because ques-
tions of fact remain concerning the third factor.1 2 9
For example, in Swarovski Aktiengesellschaft v. Building No. 19,
Inc.,'20 the First Circuit examined whether a court had conducted the
proper analysis in granting Swarovski's motion for a preliminary in-
junction.1' The dispute arose when Building 19 salvaged a large
shipment of Swarovski crystal-which still contained certificates of
authenticity-that had been sold in an insurance sale after a severe
123 Id. at 304.
124 Id. at 304-05.
125 Id. at 305.
126 Id. at 308.
127 Id. at 309.
128 Id. (stating only that defendant "says nothing that expressly or by fair implication con-
notes endorsement orjoint sponsorship on the part of the New Kids").
129 See, e.g., Standard Process, Inc. v. Total Health Disc., Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 932, 938-39
(E.D. Wisc. 2008) (dismissing a motion for summary judgment based on doubts sur-
rounding the third factor).
130 704 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2013).
131 Id. at 46.
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storm damaged the warehouse in which it had been stored.3 2 In light
of this acquisition, Building 19 bought a series of advertisements,
which promoted two one-day-only sales of the merchandise. '" Swa-
rovski promptly sent Building 19 a cease-and-desist letter regarding
the advertisements, and sued for an injunction when Building 19 at-
tempted to run a new advertisement.' Building 19 defended its use
of the Swarovski mark on the basis that there was no likelihood of
confusion, and that nominative fair use applied.'3 5
In beginning its analysis, the First Circuit noted, "there is no indi-
cation from the record that the district court found a likelihood of
confusion either under the traditional eight-factor Pignons test or un-
der the nominative fair use test."'6 Nevertheless, after suggesting the
two doctrines operated as discrete and unique analyses, the First Cir-
cuit concluded, "[t] he district court erred by granting Swarovski's re-
quest for a preliminary injunction without first finding that Building
# 19's use of its mark in the proposed advertisement was likely to cause
confusion."" The circuit court pointed to the district court's analysis
of the second factor-whether the defendant used more of the mark
than necessary-and noted that it had simply asked whether the de-
fendant had used too big a font on the advertisement at issue, rather
than whether the ad would cause confusion.' The real problem,
however, was that the court required an enormous amount of discov-
ery before ever turning to fair use, making it highly likely that de-
fendants would generally feel pressured to settle given the uncertain-
ty and cost of pursuing the defense.
The second problem with nominative fair use arises from subse-
quent courts' refusal to employ it in the early stages of litigation, sig-
nificantly lowering its ability to protect those engaging in fair uses
from litigation costs. In fact, the Ninth Circuit has simply trans-
formed nominative fair use into a substitute for the traditional likeli-
hood of confusion test, requiring similarly large amounts of grueling
discovery.'39 This development significantly undermined the "gate-
keeper" role-setting aside cases that fell outside of trademark law
132 Id. at 47.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 47, 48.
135 Id. at 47-49.
136 Id. at 50-51.
137 Id. at 53 (emphasis added).
138 Id. at 52-53.
139 Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002).
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long before summary judgment-that nominative fair use could have
performed.'"
While disapproving of this approach, which placed the burden of
proof on the defendant, the Third Circuit actually made the situation
worse by bifurcating the analysis in Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lend-
ingtree, Inc.'4 1 In Century 21, the plaintiff asserted that Lendingtree's
use of its trademark on its website in conjunction with its operation of
a referral service for relators constituted infringement.1 4 1 In defense,
Lendingtree asserted that its use of the mark on the website was a
143fair, nominative use.
To combat the Ninth Circuit's unfair burden on defendants, the
Third Circuit held the plaintiff would have to first prove confusion is
likely.'" Only after the plaintiff had met that burden would the bur-
den shift to the defendant to prove that its nominative use was none-
theless fair.44 But, given this arrangement requires a likelihood of
confusion analysis, any resolution of a nominative fair use question
inevitably requires a large amount of discovery, undermining any
hope of a bright line rule.
Finally, nominative fair use's many overlaps with classical fair use
has resulted in ever more complicated machinations to distinguish
the two, creating an insolvable, unusable morass.'" As William
McGeveran notes, while the Ninth Circuit attempted to separate the
two doctrines in Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., the test proved fair too
difficult to apply in common scenarios.4 4 For example, in Brother Rec-
ords, Inc. v. Jardine, the Ninth Circuit addressed a case in which a for-
mer member of the Beach Boys used the band's trademark to de-
scribe himself when promoting his solo act.'" The court concluded,
"[the] 'classic' fair use defense applies when a defendant uses a
trademark in its 'primary, descriptive sense'-its dictionary meaning,
more or less."149 This convoluted standard resulted in the court's
humorous comment that the Beach Boys' mark did not "denote ...
'boys who frequent a stretch of sand by the sea,"' nor were the New
140 McGeveran, supra note 39, at 91.
141 Id. at 92 (citing Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir.
2005)).
142 Century 21, 425 F.3d at 216.
143 Id. at 217.
144 Id. at 222.
145 Id.
146 McGeveran, supra note 39, at 93-94.
147 Id. at 93 (quoting Cairns v. Franklin Mint. Co, 292 F.3d 1139, 1152 (9th Cir. 2002)).
148 Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 905 (9th Cir. 2003).
149 McGeveran, supra note 39, at 94 (citing Brother Records, 318 F.3d at 905).
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Kids on the Block "'children who recently moved to this area bound-
ed by streets on four sides.'15 0 Consequently, the court found that
the former Beach Boys member's use of the trademark was a nomina-
tive fair use. But this standard offers almost no help to those trying to
figure out how to distinguish between nominative and descriptive fair
use.
The combination of these three issues has rendered the nomina-
tive fair use defense essentially useless except in the most obvious of
cases, such as New Kids. Once again, the failure to clearly define
"trademark use" and explain the defense's procedure has sapped
nominative fair use of its effectiveness.
D. The TDRA's Categorical Statutory Exemptions
Congress dramatically expanded the scope of protections for the
nation's most famous marks when it passed both the FTDA and
TDRA. Yet it also set in place specific protections and limitations to
the law at the same time.15 ' The acts protect "any fair use," but specify
uses in connection with:
A) i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers to compare goods
or services; or ii) identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting
upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous
mark owner. B) All forms of news reporting and news commentary. C)
Any noncommercial use of a mark.1
5
2
Though at first glance the language of the TDRA seems quite unam-
biguous, the problems that arise in conjunction with the defenses are
anything but simple. The addition of "nominative or descriptive fair
use" just before the quoted text above risks importing all the prob-
lems associated with those defenses. Moreover, the TDRA specifically
added the important note that the use of a mark as "a designation of
source for the person's own goods or services," may not be consid-
ered a fair use. 5 3 Because this "as a mark" language almost always re-
quires a likelihood of confusion analysis, it negates any possible ad-
vantages of a clear, straightforward fair use provision. Instead of
improving and expanding the protection of speech with the TDRA,
Congress actually accomplished the opposite. The TDRA eliminated
150 Brother Records, 318 F.3d at 907 & n.3.
151 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3, 109 Stat. 985, 985-986
(1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000)). But see, Trademark Dilution Revision Act
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2, 120 Stat. 1730, 1731 (2006). The amendment also
moved the exclusions from 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (4) to § 1125(c) (3).
152 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)(3)(A-C).
153 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (3).
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the FTDA's originally unambiguous language, and instead of leaving
a simple, effective rule, left the test much more muddled.'M
While there have been few cases examining the issue, at least one
recent court decision has interpreted this language as simply a codifi-
cation of the nominative fair use doctrine and a standalone "parody
fair use" into dilution law. In Radiance Foundation, Inc. v. NAACP, the
question faced by the district court was whether the use of the term
"National Association for the Abortion of Colored People" on a Pro-
life website constituted trademark infringement and dilution.15 5 To
defend against the dilution claim, the Radiance Foundation argued
its use fell under the TDRA's fair use provisions listed above."
As predicted, the court fell into the exact trap of limiting Section
A of the TDRA's fair use provision to just parody and nominative fair
use.' After completing an enormous section analyzing the likeli-
hood of confusion, the court found that the article in question did
not "describe nor reference" the services of the NAACP, thus it could
not be a nominative fair use. It also concluded that the parody
claim was ineffective because a likelihood of confusion could arise
given the manner in which the mark was used, and because it did not
clearly convey "two simultaneous and contradictory messages-that it
is the NAACP, but also that it is not the NAACP." 59 The court also
summarily dismissed a defense under Section B, because the article
did not use the correct name of the NAACP.6Oo Finally, the court held
that because there were opportunities for visitors to donate to the
site, Radiance could not claim they were using the mark in a non-
commercial manner.16'
The case above perfectly illustrates the problems with the TDRA
current fair use defenses. The addition of the new language has im-
ported all the problems with the defenses examined above, by limit-
ing the courts to nominative fair use instead of a broader more
sweeping defense. Moreover, as the case above illustrates, even when
the "use as a mark" seems extremely tenuous, courts are unafraid to
find the user liable for trademark dilution.
154 McGeveran, supra note 39, at 108-109.
155 Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP, 25 F.Supp.3d 865, 871 (E.D. Va. 2014).
156 Id. at 891.
157 Id. at 896-97.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 893.
160 Id. at 898.
161 Id. at 898-99.
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E. What Comes Next?
Scholars are nearly unanimous in their contention that some form
of change is needed in trademark fair use given the anti-competitive
and chilling effects trademark's expansion has incurred.162  Thus,
what can be learned from these four doctrine's failings? First, as with
the trademark use doctrine, failing to define "a use in commerce"
constitutes a fatal flaw, as it almost always, except in the most obvious
cases, devolves into a likelihood of confusion analysis. Second, an ef-
fective fair use doctrine must be applied universally across circuits in
the same manner, thus requiring statutory action by Congress or a
detailed test laid out by the Supreme Court. Either course poses sig-
nificant challenges, though the Court has laid some basic ground-
work for such a change. Finally, these tests show the most effective
defense may be the simplest. Though a simple test may not always
give a popular answer, litigants often find predictability far more val-
uable than ensuring every case results in a "right" answer.
A fair use defense rooted in the First Amendment appears to be
the most natural solution to many of these problems. Thus far, fair
use defenses have developed piece-meal in response to various devel-
opments in trademark law.'63 As explained above, this has left signifi-
cant gaps as the defenses have developed on an ad hoc basis, normal-
ly without a principled justification.164 By instituting limits on
trademark based on the value of First Amendment rights in commer-
cial speech, the Supreme Court or Congress could institute a princi-
pled, universally applicable limit on trademark law, which does not
exist today. Unfortunately, the Court's initial forays in this realm
have reaped mixed results.
162 See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark
Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1674 (2007) (noting that without a trademark use require-
ment, "trademark holders could severely limit a whole host of legitimate but unauthor-
ized use of their marks, particularly (but not exclusively) in the online context"); Connie
Davis Nichols & Charley Carroll, Trouble in Trademark Law: How Applying Different Theories
Leaves Door Open for Abuse, 17 S.M.U. Sci. & TECH. L. REv. 1, 6 (2014) (affirming the need
for trademark owners to police their marks, but calling for the courts to offer relief to
secondary mark users who are unfairly targeted by established mark owners in the name
of policing); Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61
S.M.U. L. REV. 381, 389-90 (2008) (highlighting the possibility of using the First Amend-
ment's free expression clause to limit the expansion of trademark law); Hannibal Travis,
The Battle for Mindshare: The Emerging Consensus that the First Amendment Protects Corporate
Criticism and Parody on the Internet, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH., 5-6 (2005) (warning that trade-
mark law has become a threat to criticism and parody of corporations, but also noting
that the First Amendment places limits on a mark holder's rights).
163 See generally supra Parts II and IV.
164 See supra Part IV.
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IV. CURRENT FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITS IN TRADEMARK LAW
Trademark law has struggled recently to balance its protections
with the guarantees of the First Amendment. Traditionally, the use
of a mark in commercial advertising and packaging for specific com-
mercial products fit the Supreme Court's definition of "pure com-
mercial speech."'" As examined in Part III supra, because the Su-
preme Court had historically held that "the Constitution impose [d]
no restraint on government [power] as respects purely commercial
advertising,""" courts generally understood that rademark law did
not threaten First Amendment rights. But, the law changed dramati-
cally in 1976, when the Court explicitly held that the First Amend-
ment applied to and protected commercial speech in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.67  The
Court justified its decision by noting that society had an interest in
the "free flow of commercial information."' Thus, with its decision
in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court has suggested that even
certain purely commercial uses of trademarks could fall under the
protection of the First Amendment.
The Court has been even more explicit in regards to noncommer-
cial uses of trademarks, finding Constitutional limits to trademark law
especially when it comes to "expressive uses" of trademarks." More-
over, as discussed supra in Part III, there is mounting evidence that
the Court's characterization of commercial speech as a second class
citizen may be crumbling to the point that it enjoys nearly equal pro-
tection as the other forms of expressive or political speech.' Regard-
less of whether this change comes to fruition, the increasing recogni-
tion that commercial speech involves something protectable indicates
that the Supreme Court may recognize a need to supplement the ex-
165 Ramsey, supra note 56, at 396.
166 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
167 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976).
168 Id. at 764-65.
169 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) ("[T]he government's
asserted interest [in keeping people] ignorant in order to manipulate their choices ....
is per se illegitimate and can no more justify regulation of 'commercial' speech than it can
justify regulation of 'noncommercial' speech.") (Thomas, J., concurring); In re R.M.J.,
455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (interpreting the First Amendment to limit professional adver-
tising regulations to deceptive practices); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15 (1979) (clar-
ifying when restrictions prevent misleading practices without impeding the free flow of
information).
170 Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny, supra note 56, at 393-94.
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isting doctrines surrounding trademark law with constitutional
bounds.
A. The Current Balancing Test
Although courts have not completely ignored the First Amend-
ment in their applications of trademark law, the current doctrine re-
mains in its infancy. Today, courts determine whether or not a given
trademark use warrants First Amendment protection by weighing the
risk of consumer confusion against the public interest.7' The current
test, laid out for example by the Second Circuit in Cliff Notes, Inc. v.
Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., though adequately pro-
tecting the interests of the trademark owner, provides no guidance
for how to weigh the two values.'72 In Cliff Notes, the defendant had
created a parody called "Spy Notes" which comically imitated the
plaintiffs line of book outlines.73 When Cliff Notes claimed trade-
mark infringement, Bantam asserted that the sardonic work was pro-
tected as parody under the First Amendment.174
Examining the plaintiffs claim, the court first noted that the
Lanham Act had to be construed "'narrowly"' when First Amendment
values were relevant in a given case. This means that "where an ex-
pressive work is alleged to infringe a trademark, it is appropriate to
weigh the public interest in free expression against the public interest
in avoiding consumer confusion.",7 " But because there was no further
guidance, the Second Circuit simply proceeded to balance the com-
peting interests between the public interest in avoiding consumer
confusion and the value of expressive works; subsequently, the court
found that the balance tipped in favor of finding the defendant's use
was fair. 177
Consequently, in the aftermath of Cliff Notes, Second Circuit pro-
cedure merely stated that a court first examine the nine likelihood of
confusion factors, then investigate any First Amendment concerns,
and only then weigh the two.'7" Though far from perfect, even the
171 See, e.g., Cliff Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d
Cir. 1989) (examining the availability of First Amendment protection for parody).
172 Id.
173 Id. at 492-93.
174 Id. at 493.
175 Id. at 494.
176 Id.
177 Cliff Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir.
1989).
178 Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993); see gener-
ally Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prod'ns, Inc., 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996) (using
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four factor balancing test for finding fair use in copyright law gives
specific criteria-such as the amount of copyrighted material used
and the nature of that use-that judges should weigh when determin-
ing whether or not a given expression violates a copyright holder's
exclusive rights.7
Further complicating matters, the only other case offering any
guidance, Rogers v. Grimaldi, specifically limited itself to allegedly mis-
leading titles of artistic works that use a celebrity's name."' In Rogers,
the plaintiff asserted that the defendant filmmaker had violated the
Lanham Act by using her first name, Ginger, in a film that told the
story of fictional characters who imitated Rogers."' Rogers asserted
that the title created "the false impression that the film was about her
or that she sponsored, endorsed, or was otherwise involved in the
film.""' The Rogers test that the court developed to analyze these kind
of challenges significantly favors defendants, only finding liability
when a "title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatso-
ever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly mis-
leads as to the source or the content of the work."' Conversely, the
test does not explain what constitutes "explicit misleading," nor does
it explain how a court should apply the test procedurally. Like the
Cliff Notes' test, the Rogers test only helps in very limited circumstances
and often where a case's outcome appears predetermined.
B. Lessons Learned
Although there have been hints of other tests, such as First
Amendment protection for the use of trademarks which have "trans-
cended their identifying purpose" and "assume [d] a role outside the
bounds of trademark law,"18 4 no coherent, overarching doctrine has
yet materialized. The current First Amendment limitations to trade-
mark law do not give adequate guidance to judges, who are often
forced to consider fair use defenses near the end of discovery, after
most of a case's expenses have accrued.
the likelihood of confusion test before looking at other concerns); Charles Atlas, Ltd. v.
DC Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that First Amendment
protections and likelihood of confusion tests must be balanced in denying summary
judgment).
179 17 U.S.C. § 107.
180 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
181 Id. at 996-997.
182 Id. at 997.
183 Id. at 999.
184 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J.) (discussing
the use of trademarks in idioms such as "'the Rolls-Royce of its class'").
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For a First Amendment fair use doctrine to prevent the possibility
of trademark law's chilling effect on speech, a defendant must be
able to invoke it early on in proceedings and it must give clear guid-
ance to the courts who apply it."8 Without clarity, owners will be em-
boldened to file significant strike suits, the strength of which, users,
both large and small, will be unable to evaluate. 86 By acknowledging
the weaknesses of current fair use doctrines, a new doctrine may fi-
nally shed some light on this opaque area of law.
A perfect example of the problems contained in modern trade-
mark law can be found in the legal tumult surrounding SodaStream's
brilliant marketing campaign in 2012. The campaign consisted of
large bins in airports containing cans and bottles-including those of
Coca-Cola and other Coke brands-with a tagline: "So-
dastream ... SAVE the world from 5078 bottles & cans per family, every 3
years .... " "' Coca-Cola, faced with the possibility of competition, sent
SodaStream a cease and desist letter asserting that the use of Coke
bottles in the display constituted trademark infringement and dilu-
tion.'88 While most intuitively would say that such a use should be
perfectly legal, none of the current trademark fair use defenses would
quickly dispense with this case.
Each of the defenses listed above would fail in turn. Like "key-
ing," SodaStream's displays clearly contained a trademark and were
certainly advertisements used in commerce, making a trademark use
defense inapplicable. Given this use was not descriptive of a product,
nor used Coke in a nominative sense-that is, the advertisements did
not discuss Coca-Cola in any manner-neither descriptive nor nomi-
native fair use would apply. The TDRA's protection of product com-
parison could possibly apply in this case, however, the displays did
not really compare the two products. Instead, the displays simply
made statements about how many cans and bottles could be saved by
using SodaStream. Moreover, even if the defense did apply, it would
only protect SodaStream from the dilution claim. Thus, SodaStream
would have to prove through a likelihood of confusion test that the
use did not raise a likelihood of customer confusion, a possibly very
expensive proposition. Thus, there would be significant pressure on
185 See, e.g., William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IowA L. REv. 49, 61-65, 65
(2008) ("In sum, structural aspects of the existing trademark fair use doctrines deter un-
licensed expressive uses of trademarks or, alternatively, encourage capitulation in the face
of legal action.").
186 See supra notes 37-55 and accompanying text
187 Letter from K Thompson, Attorney, Adams & Adams - Pretoria, to Soda-Club (SA) Lim-
ited (June 8, 2012) (on file with author).
188 Id.
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SodaStream to either take down the display or spend significant re-
sources to defend the campaign and risk a finding of liability. Cases
like these illustrate the need for a quick, efficient fair use doctrine
that would apply early on. A new heightened pleading standard,
which recognized the First Amendment protections afforded to
commercial speech, could offer such protection.
V. THE WAY FORWARD: A PLEADING STANDARD CONSISTENT WITH THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
As explained in Parts IV and V, current fair use doctrines simply
cannot meet the demands of the modern, fast-paced, internet-driven
world. Whether clouded by ambiguity, bogged down in the necessity
for time- and resource-taxing discovery, or severely limited in scope,
the current doctrines do anything but quickly and efficiently resolve
disputes. This lack of clarity in the law also discourages innovative,
new advertising campaigns designed to share important information
with consumers; this situation ultimately results in the limitation of
commercial speech protected by the First Amendment under the Su-
preme Court's decision in Virginia State Board. Moreover, as ex-
plained supra in Part II, such uncertainty leads to aggressive trade-
mark owner behavior and unleashes trademark's anti-competitive
effects.
By removing the ambiguities from, and explicitly recognizing, the
First Amendment's limitations on trademark law, the courts or Con-
gress could rectify this problem. The solution lies in recognizing that
a trademark's value only lies in its ability to communicate infor-
mation about the quality and nature of the good,"9 and that, conse-
quently, their creation need not be incentivized with extensive pro-
tections like copyright or patent. Moreover, given that trademark
law's value lies in reducing consumer search costs,9o First Amend-
ment protection should apply to any use of a trademark that does not
clearly attempt to divert consumers away from the mark's owner,
which would raise consumer costs by causing confusion and does not
fall under the First Amendment's protection of truthful, informative
commercial speech.
To enforce this rule, lawmakers or the Supreme Court should in-
stitute a higher pleading standard for those alleging trademark in-
189 Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) ("The fundamental purpose of a
trademark is to reduce consumer search costs by providing a concise and unequivocal
identifier of the particular source of particular goods.").
190 See supra Part II.
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fringement. The standard would require a trademark plaintiff to
plead facts that, if true, clearly and convincingly show that a defend-
ant's use could divert customers from the mark's owner. A prima fa-
cie case could be established by showing: (a) the defendant used an
identical mark to the plaintiffs on its own products (from which a
court could infer an attempt to divert customers) or (b) the defend-
ant used a mark so obviously similar to the plaintiffs that reasonable
minds could differ on the source of the marked goods or services in
question.
For dilution, a plaintiff would have to allege facts that, if true,
clearly and convincingly showed a defendant's use of a mark: (a)
traded on the goodwill associated with the plaintiffs mark, thereby
decreasing its distinctiveness, or (b) harmed the goodwill associated
with the plaintiffs mark. Both standards would require courts to
adopt inferences in favor of the plaintiff, provided those inferences
were at least as likely as those favoring the defendant. Though not
explicitly a First Amendment "test," if a plaintiff failed to meet either
of these standards, the use would be treated as a constitutional fair
use of the mark under the First Amendment, regardless of whether
the speech was commercial.
Not only would such a pleading standard avoid the pitfalls that be-
fell the fair use protections outlined above, it would also reflect the
history and theory undergirding trademark law. By fulfilling trade-
mark's purpose by preventing individuals from unfairly using the
goodwill of another's mark, the standard would ensure that consum-
ers could trust the authenticity of marks in general. Thus, it would
lower consumer search costs, while preventing any infringement of
corporations and individuals' First Amendment rights. These stand-
ards would protect the commercial speech protected by the First
Amendment-that is, truthful, non-deceptive speech-while allowing
mark holders to pursue those whose actions harm the value of the
marks they have worked to develop.
A heightened pleading standard would also offer the added bene-
fit of answering the fair use question at an extremely early stage of lit-
igation, before the vast costs associated with discovery would accrue.
Such a standard would effectively deal with the problems associated
with current fair use defenses: ambiguity, cost, complexity, and lim-
ited scope.
The SodaStream example examined supra perfectly illustrates the
benefits of such a pleading standard given that the case would likely
proceed under the other defenses. To pass the proposed pleading
standard, Coca-Cola would have to allege that SodaStream's display
diverted customers away from Coke's products because they mistak-
May 2016] 1577
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
enly believed that SodaStream's product came from Coke. Given that
SodaStream's mark bears no resemblance to Coke's marks, and that
Coke's marks occurred on a random assortment of cans and bottles
in the display and not on any of SodaStream's products, the hypo-
thetical court would dismiss the case given that neither of the height-
ened pleading standard's criteria were met.
The result would be essentially the same for Coca-Cola's dilution
claim. This case would be somewhat closer given that Coca-Cola
could conceivably plead that SodaStream's use of Coke marks in con-
junction with the negative connotation of bottles and cans decreases
Coke's marks appeal. But, it could not merely allege the veracity of
that claim given the "clear and convincing" requirement.
To pass the pleading standard for dilution, Coca-Cola would have
to allege facts that showed people developed a negative attitude to
Coke marks in particular and not simply canned/bottled soda as a re-
sult of this display. Only if it could allege these facts would the case
go further. This would likely take at least some preliminary research
on the part of Coca-Cola, which is exactly the kind of expenses that
deter strike suits, something that current fair use defenses fail to do.
Thus, even if Coke were able to move forward in this case, it could
only do so after actually doing the research to show it had been
harmed. In that case, such a case should move forward given the det-
rimental effects on Coke, even if it would likely be estopped by the
current fair use defenses contained in the TDRA.
These results would benefit society because it would allow So-
daStream to advertise an environmentally friendly alternative to
canned soda. This kind of trademark "use" is exactly the kind of
speech and competition that the First Amendment should protect so
long as the claims that are made are true because they are informa-
tive, and thus fall under the First Amendment's protection. These
kind of uses fosters competition between products, which in turn
forces companies to invest in new products and services rather than
simply using trademark to stifle newcomers to a given market.
Some scholars and trademark owners will inevitably argue that
such a standard raises the bar far too high at the pleading stage and
unfairly limits mark holders' rights under the Lanham Act. Yet, as
explained above in Part II, Congress never intended trademark law to
give owners an exclusive right to use certain words, phrases, etc., in
the public sphere as a whole. Trademark law was always intended to
protect consumers by preventing competitors from using another
191 See supra Part I.B.
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merchant's marks to sell goods inferior to those of the mark's own-
er.'1 2 Moreover, given that this standard would come at the pleading
stage, and because the evidence in infringement claims often centers
around public surveys, the standard would not prevent trademark
claims as general rule. As applied in most cases, the standard would
simply require the plaintiff to show that a defendant's use of trade-
mark will result in actual harm to the plaintiff. Without a limit such
as the pleading standard outlined above, an unlimited trademark law
could rapidly expand beyond its logical confines, and allow corpora-
tions to threaten litigation to force other companies to capitulate.'3
This standard adequately balances the purpose of trademark law,
to prevent consumer confusion as to the origin of their trademark
goods, while preventing expansive trademark protections from
abridging First Amendment rights in commercial and expressive.
Though all tests will have some failures, this test would protect con-
sumers from those who attempt to use other's trademarks, while en-
suring that those same consumers may express themselves and com-
petitors may vie for their attention. Perhaps most importantly, it
would give both sides a clear law from which individuals and corpora-
tions alike may plan their businesses.
CONCLUSION
Though perhaps not at the forefront of the public or legal com-
munity's mind, trademark law has significant effects on the way in
which people shop, express themselves, and even talk about the
world. Without limiting trademark law's scope, our discussions of the
world could be significantly limited. Fair use doctrine, rooted in the
First Amendment, ensures that those limitations are avoided. Ensur-
ing that these doctrines effectively protect rigorous competition and
expression should be a priority for Congress and the courts, and a
new pleading standard, like the one outlined above, may be the an-
swer to the fair use problem.
192 See supra Part II.
193 See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier, SA v. Hyundai Motor America, No. 10-Civ-1611, 2012
WL 1022247 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012) (finding a three second clip of a commercial show-
ing the 'LV' mark on a basketball was not fair use and infringed Louis Vuitton's trade-
mark).
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